1: Nadel E-5 (1934-1936) 1942
FF52 Nupe FF52

182 643 794 the present head of the *ndakó gboyá* society, was invested with the pompous title of *Majĭ Dodo*, Master of the Monster, and with this royal recognition the organization of the society was made subservient to Nupe kingship. One after the other the heads of the society received their titles from the *Etsu* Nupe. Villages and districts which sought the help of the *ndakó gboyá* against witches had to apply first to the king. This new royal prerogative also entailed a considerable economic benefit: for the king shared in the income of the order which was derived from the gifts collected in the villages which had called in the *ndakó gboyá*.[1] But besides tapping a new source of income the co-operation between *Etsu* and anti-witchcraft society meant adding to the centralized temporal jurisdiction the power of spiritual, mystic jurisdiction over the supernatural enemies of society. This powerful prerogative of the king was, in fact, maintained by the Mohammedan Fulani Emirs till very recently.[2]

182 642 797 Every performance of these various rituals and cults in the villages and towns of Nupe—and many are still performed every year, long after the disappearance of the Tsoede dynasty—revived and perpetuated the consciousness of this unity which has grown into far more than an external bond of political unification. With the Islamization of the country many of these factors lost their power. The Fulani rulers could use the secret organization of the *ndakó gboyá*; they could seize by force, as they actually did, the royal insignia from the last Nupe king. They could not transfer the authority of the former 'mythical charter' to their own alien rulership. But they could introduce another, younger, and perhaps more powerful uniting force, Islam—Islam as creed and Islam as education. Mosques, a *Liman* and Mallams in every village, these are the instruments of propaganda.[3] And in every religious service, in every babbling little Mallam school this propaganda is enacted. Teaching Islam means teaching the holy cause which sent the conquerors down to this country. Praying to Allah means praying to the God of the powerful and sharing with them, if not their power, their beliefs. But Mohammedanism even becomes a real means of social approach between rulers and ruled. In a country still to a large extent pagan the adoption of Mohammedanism creates something like an intermediary social stratum, placed nearer to the rulers than the rest of the population. Formerly it involved—at least in theory—certain concrete benefits: an increased measure of security, above all, immunity from slave-raids (as the Koran forbids the enslaving of Mohammedans). This rule, however, was never strictly obeyed—unless the religious qualification was supported by the

[661] [1] The *ndakó gboyá* society soon became a means of ruthless exploitation. The king and the members of the society were extorting money from the peasants all over the country on the grounds of ridding their villages of witches. This became so intolerable that eventually the Administration of Bida Emirate had to forbid all performances of the *ndako gboyá*. (For a fuller description see *Africa*, 1935, 4.)

[2] It is interesting to note that when the independent Emirate of Patigi was created by the Government this new Nupe ruler appointed a second *Majĭ Dodo* for his country.

[3] Mokwa, a village of 2,000 inhabitants, possesses eight mosques, one of them built in 1934 during my stay in the village.

1: Nadel E-5 (1934-1936) 1942
FF52 Nupe FF52

more solid bond of political protection embodied in clientship. Attachment to the ruling group thus fused with conversion to its religion. In the early days of Fulani rule hundreds of pagans are said to have flocked into the capital to seek out an important person as their patron and to declare to him—and not to the religious officers of Islam—their readiness to embrace Mohammedanism. They received their turban and sword, insignia of clientship and new creed in one. Of such men the Nupe say not 'they become Mohammedans' but '*a ze goiži*'—'they become Fulani'.

Whatever the true essence of Mohammedan faith may be in Nupe, and however sparsely Mohammedanism has so far spread, Fulani rulership did create, and is creating, another 'mythical charter' of the kingdom. It tries again, with its new means, to mould the religious elements into the intensive unit almost of a State Church.[1] The effect of Islam as a 'binding force' of the precarious political system that the Fulani had erected cannot be doubted. A striking example is that under *Etsu* Umaru the whole Trans-Kaduna revolted, refused to pay the tribute, and finally made war on Bida. The rebellious peasants crossed the Kaduna river, marched against Bida and almost reached it, being defeated at a place called Bidakoko, a few miles outside.[2] The whole Trans-Kaduna, that is, with the exception of one town—the strongly Mohammedanized Dabbă, the same t wn where Mallam Dendo started his proselytizing work in Nupe, and which now refused to join in the war against the rulers with whom they shared their creed.

The identification of State and Church is demonstrated in the annual Mohammedan festival, the *Sallah*, which is as much a pageant of the might and splendour of the kingdom as a religious feast. There are two *Sallah* feasts, the Small *Sallah* and the Great *Sallah*, separated by a two months' interval.[3] Their celebration may be called the climax of the whole year's cycle: the two feasts give the months in which they fall their names—*etswa talagi* and *etswa salakó*, 'month of the Small *Sallah*' and 'month of the Great *Sallah*'; and to these the people look forward and look back, in the long-drawn preparations and anticipation, and in recollections and memories. The *Sallah* feast is like a Friday celebration on an immensely enlarged scale. On the first day the king on horseback under the state umbrella and surrounded by his noblemen and state officials, leads the vast procession to the praying-ground outside the town, where the *Liman* holds the service. After the service the procession returns to the royal residence. Here a great display of horsemanship takes place, at which the bodyguard of the king, his police, and officers of state parade before him and his guests of honour—the foremost among whom are the District Officer and all the Europeans living

[1] See C. K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria*, 1925: 'Islam . . . has converted isolated pagan groups into nations; . . . it is largely due to Islam that numbers of tribes are now, before our eyes, forming themselves into nations' (ii, pp. 4, 10).

[2] It is said that this name Bidakoko was later given to the place of the battle, because *koko a tũ Bida o*, 'almost they (the rebellious army) had reached Bida'.

[3] The Nigerian *Sallah* is the *Beiram* or *Id* of other Mohammedan countries, which feasts are also celebrated twice, as 'Little *Beiram*' and 'Great *Beiram*'.

2: Nadel E-5 (1934-1936) 1954
FF52 Nupe FF52

their lives rather than at any other, and with so little formality. The people can offer no explanation save the non-committal 'it is the custom'. It is, then, a custom whose general 'content' of aims seems clear, but whose particular 'form' appears arbitrary if not ill-chosen.

(ii) *Marriage*

Including all the various preliminaries, the wedding ceremonial is a long drawn-out affair, occupying twelve days, divided into three phases of four days. It begins when the bride puts on (or 'enters') the veil, which she will put aside only on the twelfth day, after the consummation. Even afterwards she will continue to wear the veil whenever she leaves the house or meets strangers (for another month in the villages, for three months in Bida), but may remain unveiled in the company of her husband and relations. During the first four days the bride's house is the centre of activities. The bride will bathe, stain hands and feet with henna, and don her wedding dress. Thus attired she and her family will receive visitors, and the bride's young female companions will sing and clap hands, the typical accompaniment of girls' songs and dances. The feast reaches its climax on the fourth day, when professional drummers and musicians are hired for the occasion and the bride's father offers food and drink to numerous guests.

Among them will be two envoys of the bridegroom, his brother and his best friend, who have come to accompany the bride to her future home. Among the pagans, the two men also attend the sacrifice performed by the bride's father on that day. This sacrifice (of beer and a cock) is intended for the *kuci* and is performed privately at the usual place for family sacrifices—over an ancestral grave, a twin shrine, or in front of an hereditary *cigbe*. The bride's father briefly invokes *Sokó*, asking for a prosperous marriage, blessed with children. Among Mohammedans, the religious rite involves the presence of a mallam, and every family will try to secure the offices of a famous one. The mallam, in front of all the guests, will announce the marriage, offer up prayers for bride and bridegroom, and recite the names and titles of their fathers and grandfathers as well as (having been carefully primed) the details of the brideprice and dowry. In the Mohammedan version a public ceremonial thus again replaces the private sacrifice, and secular ostentation is mingled with the religious rite. Let us note that in Mohammedan practice this solemn announcement of the marriage also establishes, formally and legally, the marriage bond, the episode being in fact referred to as *pá yawó*, 'tying the marriage'; while the pagan ceremonial replaces this precise, single act by a more circuitous procedure, of which the sacrifice to the *kuci* is the first step.

2: Nadel E-5 (1934-1936) 1954
FF52 Nupe FF52

585 Afterwards the bride is taken to her new home by the bridegroom's envoys, accompanied by her girl friends, her father's younger sister, her mother's brother, as well as some drummers and musicians. If the marriage is between families living in the same village or town, the procession will start after nightfall since it is 'shameful' for the bride to be seen on this occasion (her veil notwithstanding). If the marriage is between villages too far apart for a short walk after dark, the procession starts at daybreak the next morning. Should the bride be then seen by others, which can hardly be avoided, she must kneel down and sob realistically to show 'how ashamed she is'. In Bida, it is now customary for the bride to ride on a more or less beautifully caparisoned horse to her [797] new home—another Mohammedan innovation and another chance for displaying wealth and status.

In the next phase the scene shifts to the bridegroom's house. The bride is received by her parents-in-law and taken to her sleeping hut, which has been decorated and painted. Here she will stay in seclusion, in the company of her aunt, her girl friends and a married woman from the bridegroom's family (usually his mother's younger sister). The women and girls take no share in the 'merry-making' which will presently start in the other parts of the house, but pass their time chatting and singing womens' songs. On the morning after the bride's arrival the bridegroom's father performs a sacrifice to the *kuci*, which is an exact replica of the one previously performed in the bride's house and is again attended by an envoy from the other family (now the bride's mother's brother). This ritual is clearly meant to affirm the acceptance of the bride into the new family and lineage and, in duplicating the previous sacrifice in the bride's house, to 'tie', or complete in tying, the marriage bond. It is not surprising that the Mohammedan ceremonial [797] includes no counterpart to this double ritual; for there can be no need to 'tie the marriage' again; while the public announcement of the marriage by the mallam, coupling as it does the names of the spouses as well as the names of their fathers and grandfathers, also obviates the need for a separate ceremonial of 'acceptance'.

On the same day the festivities begin, to which all the friends and relatives of the bridegroom's family are invited. Neither this nor the concluding phase of the wedding feast include any specifically religious features. During the 'merry-making' the emphasis is on the male participants, among whom the bridegroom's age mates figure prominently, typical men's songs and dances being alone performed. The bridegroom himself, in his finery, sits stiffly among the guests without joining in the general fun. The festivities end on the ninth day, and with them ends the segregation of the bride. On

1: Nadel E-5 (1934-1936) 1942
FF52 Nupe FF52

themselves make use of these secondary resources which they find on their land.

We may mention, finally, the various uses to which uncultivated land in the town—streets and open spaces in Bida or the larger villages—is put: women may put up little 'kitchens' by the roadside, where they cook food and sell it to passers-by; traders or craftsmen may build themselves a small hut to be used as workshop or booth; or neighbours may get together and build one of the little mosques on the open space between their houses, which you find scattered all over Bida town. No permission is necessary for these modest buildings. For larger enterprises, a big mosque, or a market, the *Etsu* in Bida or, in the village, the chief, would himself allot the necessary space. This practice includes modern requirements as well: thus *Etsu* Mohamadu, who had shown great sympathy for the work of the C.M.S. Mission, gave them a space for building a school and a compound inside Bida, in his own *ekpă* of the town, free of charge.

LIVE STOCK

Cattle-keeping plays a very secondary part in Nupe economics. This is shown most clearly in the very low *per capita* figures quoted in the statistical table at the end of this section. To-day cattle are owned only by the butchers who buy for the kill from the Bornu and Fulani cattle-traders who, with their huge herds, pass regularly through Nupe and Bida, on their way from the north and the south. I say 'to-day', because formerly many of the members of the Nupe aristocracy and the more wealthy among the Bida people used to own large herds of cattle.[1] Slaves taken from the Bororó-Fulani, the nomadic Fulani herdsmen, looked after the cattle. The cattle were always kept outside the town, frequently a long distance away; for they had to be moved from pasture to pasture according to the season, up north, away from the tsetse-infested area near the rivers, in the rains, and south again in the dry season. This meant, obviously, much trouble and cost, and this is mostly quoted as the reason which made the Nupe eventually abandon cattle-keeping altogether. *U de wahalla*, 'it is a great trouble', was the explanation given to me by the *Alkali* of Bida when I expressed my astonishment that it was so difficult nowadays to find people ready to buy a herd of cattle. I have known two cattle-owners—the last in Nupe; one was an ex-slave who died without heir in 1936 and left a herd of thirty-two head of cattle which at the time was tended for him by Fulani herdsmen who had their camp near Bida. It was at his death that the question arose where to find a buyer for the herd. The other cattle-owner was the late *Etsu* of Agaie, a Fulani by birth, who owned a large herd of very beautiful cattle, of over 200 head, which was tended by Nupe shepherds, the sons of ex-slaves of the *Etsu*.

I may, perhaps, add here an historical note: The cattle of the *Etsu* of Agaie were not, like the cattle to be seen at present in Nupe, of the

[1] Laird and Oldfield refer to the huge herds of cattle which they saw in the capital of Nupe kingdom, Rabá.

2: Nadel E-5 (1934-1936) 1954
FF52 Nupe FF52

We must note, secondly, that all the Lagos Nupe, without exception, are today Moslems. Oddly enough, they claim to be good Moslems, even though they openly and proudly 'own' the *gunnu* and the other pagan rites. Yet the people see no conflict between the faith they now profess and their adherence to the pagan cults. The two are kept in separate compartments: the Moslem faith belongs to the present; the pagan observances are a token of a past one wishes to continue: they simply go with remaining a Nupe. And if the pagan observances are also supernaturally effective, this seems almost incidental to that other, more relevant, import, of offering occasions to act as Nupe.

Finally, when the Lagos Nupe perform the public episodes of their cults, they do so in the same circumstances in which the alien enclaves in Nupe country stage their religious observances. The *gunnu* and *ndakó gboyá* are watched with keen interest by the whole native population of Lagos; above all, the Nupe 'owners' of the ceremonials are expected to perform them for the well-being of 'the whole town', including the Yoruba, and occasionally at the request of the Yoruba town chief, if some calamity (for example, witchcraft) threatens the population. Here, then, we meet with the exact counterpart of that 'religious division of labour' which turned a cult alien in Nupe into a contribution to the common weal. But the conception of the 'common weal' has been significantly widened; for the prayer formula of the Lagos ceremonials contains a new phrase—'May the whole of Nupe country prosper'. This is clearly a further expression of that 'awareness of social identity', kept alive by a tribe in exile; indeed, no more convincing expression can be conceived than this concern with the welfare of the distant mother country.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The absence, in Nupe, of complete conversions to an alien creed has a notable exception in the steady expansion of Islam. Paradoxically, though the Nupe in strange parts preserve their traditional religion because it is so much the symbol of tribal identity, in Nupe country itself that religion is disappearing. And unlike the Lagos Moslems, who keep Islam and the traditional observances apart, the Nupe in their own country have accepted 'conversion' in all its implications, including the rejection of the earlier creed. Perhaps this is no paradox. For while the emigrants have only their religion to fall back on if they wish to prove to themselves that they are still Nupe, in their own country this issue does not arise. There, Nupe social identity is still sustained by that wider 'stable array' of social facts—unbroken occupation